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Compassion Without Competence1  
MANDATING A FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE IN 
NEW DISASTER RELIEF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS  
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, nonprofit organizations have formed in the wake 
of major disasters in order to supplement disaster relief efforts. After the 
tragedies of September 11th and Hurricane Katrina alone, the number of 
newly created nonprofit organizations designed to serve disaster victims 
totaled three hundred forty-two2 and four hundred, respectively.3 The 
explosion in the number of nonprofit organizations is matched by the 
growth of their assets. From 1975 through 1995, the assets of all tax-
exempt organizations in the sector tripled.4 From 1994 through 2004, the 
assets of all tax-exempt organizations grew by an astounding ninety 
percent.5 The sector employs a larger portion of the workforce than that 
of utilities and construction, and its growth outpaces that of the economy 
in general.6 
Nonprofit organizations operate with very little regulation. As a 
result, it is no surprise that the nonprofit sector has produced high-profile 
scandals that mirror similar problems in the for-profit sector.7 Even more 
  
 1 MICHAEL F. MELCHER WITH ALEX MANDL, THE PHILANTHROPIC RESPONSE TO 9/11 
15 (2003) (quoting September 11th Fund head’s criticism of new nonprofit disaster relief providers: 
“[N]ewly created charities, decided to enter the cash-assistance business even though they lacked the 
experience and infrastructure . . . . It was compassion, but not competence”).  
 2 Harvy Lipman, Carving Out a Role in Disaster’s Wake, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, 
Oct. 6, 2005, http://www.philanthropy.com/free/articles/v18/i01/01002901.htm. 
 3 Stephanie Strom, Many Charities Founded After Hurricane Are Faltering, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2006, at A12.  
 4 JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 17 (3d ed. 
2006) (1995).  
 5 THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: FACTS AND FIGURES FROM THE NONPROFIT 
ALMANAC 3 (2007), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311373_nonprofit_sector.pdf. 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2009).  
 6 Garry V. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit 
State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1122 (2007).  
 7 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 150 (describing scandals at American 
University and Adelphi University); Katherine Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve 
Nonprofit Corporate Governance?, 75 TENN. L. REV. 83, 87-98 (2007) (describing huge nonprofit 
scandals at the University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey and the formerly nonprofit New 
York Stock Exchange); James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 
218, 219, n. 1 (2003) (describing scandals in nonprofit sector exhaustively, including incidents at 
United Way and Hale House where executives used charity funds for personal gain). Smaller 
nonprofit scandals also commonly emerge in the news headlines. See Ralph Blumenthal, Ex-
University Head in Texas on Trial for Money Misuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2007, at A8 (Dr. 
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worrisome is the assumption that the majority of nonprofit scandals 
likely go unreported.8 Aside from scandals that reveal illegal activity, the 
nonprofit sector has also been described as inefficient and wasteful.9  
This Note addresses the crisis of accountability in disaster relief 
nonprofit organizations and, by extension, the nonprofit sector as a 
whole, by arguing for the formation of a legally mandated financial 
oversight committee within new disaster relief organizations where no 
such governance mandate has so far existed. Part I explores how theft, 
fraud, waste, and the unique circumstances of the disaster relief context 
pose particular nonprofit accountability issues that warrant specific legal 
reforms.10 Part II demonstrates that the existing legal framework does not 
address and mitigate the particular problems laid out in Part I. Finally, 
Part III proposes the creation of a financial oversight committee on the 
boards of new disaster relief nonprofit organizations. This Part illustrates 
how such a governance structure will address financial accountability 
issues such as theft, fraud, and waste in the nonprofit disaster relief 
sector, and responds to likely criticisms of such a proposal.  
I. DISASTER RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS: THEFT, FRAUD, AND WASTE 
Disaster relief nonprofit organizations tend to receive rapid 
infusions of money for administration and program expenses that are 
spent on a faster timeline than in other contexts in which nonprofits serve 
even the neediest of victims. Charities received over two billion dollars 
after September 11th, with the majority of those funds coming in just two 
months after the tragedy.11 The enormous level of aid donated for victims 
of 9/11 resulted in flooded coffers at established disaster relief 
organizations12 and the fast expansion of budgets at existing foundations 
or new nonprofit organizations.13 On an even greater scale, charities 
  
Priscilla Slade, president of Texas Southern University, was alleged to have stolen $400,000); see 
also Julia Moskin, An Early Departure for Beard Board Head, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at F8 .  
 8 Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose Is Not Good for the Gander: 
Sarbanes-Oxley Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1982 (2007) (“In the seven years 
preceding 2002, officers and directors of major charitable organizations misappropriated at least 
$1.28 billion from 152 nonprofit organizations. To make matters worse, a recent Chronicle of 
Philanthropy study contends that this figure, which is based upon newspaper reports, significantly 
underestimates the scope of abuses within the nonprofit community.”).  
 9 See Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 
1999 WIS. L. REV. 227, 235 & n.26 (1999).  
 10 This section draws specifically from the aftermath of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina.  
 11 N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., SEPTEMBER 11TH CHARITABLE RELIEF: AN OVERVIEW AT ONE 
YEAR 1 (2002) (on file with author).  
 12 Id. at 2; TOM SEESSEL, THE PHILANTHROPIC RESPONSE TO 9/11: A REPORT PREPARED 
FOR THE FORD FOUNDATION 13-43 (2002), available at http://www.fordfound.org/pdfs/impact/philanthropic_ 
response.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2008) (cataloging donations received and allocated at major funds 
after 9/11).  
 13 SEESSEL, supra note 12, at 41; see also Strom, supra note 3 (“The rush to create more 
charities, while grounded in a desire to let the charity dollars flow to the most needy, is contributing 
to what many charity experts say is an overabundance of nonprofit groups, many of which will fail 
to deliver the support they promised when applying for tax-exemption.”). 
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received more than $4 billion dollars in donations following Hurricane 
Katrina.14 Given the potential for cash to flow into these new 
organizations, the fact that these organizations are often run by 
inexperienced people,15 and the unpredictable and urgent nature of 
disaster relief work,16 these organizations face unique circumstances that 
make easy for funds to be stolen by staff, fraudulently obtained by users, 
or simply wasted. Simply put, disasters create the perfect storm for a lack 
of nonprofit financial accountability.  
A. Theft 
A new disaster relief organization that grows from inception to 
receiving large amounts of revenue will generally not face the public 
scrutiny directed towards the large, established Red Cross.17 Funds 
donated for disasters can appropriately be set aside and used for 
administrative expenses for services unrelated to cash assistance, such as 
mental healthcare, that may be provided to victims in distress on an 
ongoing basis.18 However, because funds pour into the organization 
while the organization is creating ways to spend them, funds can also 
easily be stolen. As an example, one executive of a new September 11th 
charity formed to provide supportive services to all children who lost a 
parent in the attacks was later accused of stealing from his organization 
and using some of the stolen funds to pay his mortgage and credit card 
bills.19 The executive, whose brother was killed in the World Trade 
Center, also confessed to feeling continually grief-stricken and “hid[ing] 
from 9/11 in 9/11.”20 The confession may not reflect the general attitude 
of executives running new disaster relief organizations. However, the 
wide latitude given to this grief-stricken founder of a disaster relief 
  
 14 Howard Kunreuther, Op-Ed, Who Will Pay for the Next Hurricane?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 2007, at A15 (“Because of increasing development in hazard-prone areas and the effects of 
climate change, we are in a new era of catastrophic losses from natural disasters. Ten of the 20 most 
costly natural disasters have occurred during the past five years—all 10 of them hurricanes, 
typhoons or tropical storms.”). 
 15 N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 11, at 2 (“Some of those funds were created 
spontaneously by organizations with no prior experience in administering charitable assets. All of 
the September 11th charities—whether newly-formed or long-established—have confronted a 
daunting administrative burden that has severely taxed their staffs and resources.”).  
 16 Id. at 3 (“The demand for relief was huge. The logistics of dispensing aid were further 
complicated at the early stages of the disaster by the incapacitation of the communications and 
transportation infrastructure of Lower Manhattan.”).  
 17 See infra Part II.A.2 for a discussion about the limited role of state Attorneys General 
in regulating charities.  
 18 IRS, DISASTER RELIEF: PROVIDING ASSISTANCE THROUGH CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATIONS 4-5, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3833.pdf (last visited May 18, 
2009) [hereinafter IRS DISASTER RELIEF Report]; see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the federal 
tax-exempt requirements of disaster relief organizations).  
 19 James Barron, Behind Relief to 9/11 Families, A Man’s Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 
2006 (“I realized as I sat there with that $250,000 check in my hand, I was the only one who knew 
anything about it . . . and I could direct it as I saw fit.“). 
 20 Id.  
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organization to receive and spend large checks by himself without a 
mandated financial oversight committee is the norm.21  
B. Fraud 
The propensity for money to be distributed to fraudulent disaster 
victim aid applicants further justifies the need for a governance mandate. 
The flow of funds and the ease with which they are distributed led to the 
creation of over four thousand websites run by scam artists just one 
month after Hurricane Katrina.22 Alternatively, new disaster relief 
organizations also run the risk of having their funds ferreted away 
through fraudulent applications in the rush to disburse funds. Because the 
Red Cross received public scrutiny for allocating 9/11 donations towards 
long-term goals and services,23 all disaster relief providers now feel 
pressure to distribute cash assistance quickly despite the fact that this 
may hinder their ability to screen out fraudulent applicants.24 While the 
majority of cash assistance pools come from large public agencies like 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and large 
nonprofits like the Red Cross, new or small organizations do indeed raise 
funds for short-term cash assistance despite their lack of experience in 
the distribution of aid to disaster victims.25  
After September 11th and Hurricane Katrina, the level of 
fraudulently obtained money dispensed to alleged victims by 
governmental and nonprofit organizations led to an astounding loss of 
$2.6 billion dollars.26 By one report, fraudulent applications for 
September 11th aid totaled at least $5.8 million,27 while Hurricane 
Katrina fraud alone amounted to over $2 billion.28 Where the vast 
majority of the Katrina fraud involved false applications to FEMA 
programs, the New York Times reported that the Red Cross was 
  
 21 See infra Part II.B.2 for discussion of limited state and federal financial reporting 
requirements for new disaster relief organizations.  
 22 Les Christie & Jessica Seid, Katrina Scams Mushroom, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 23, 
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/09/pf/beware_disaster_scams/index.htm. 
 23 See infra note 93.  
 24 Jacqueline L. Salmon, Fraud Alleged at Red Cross Call Centers, WASH. POST, Dec. 
27, 2005, at A5 (“[C]harity experts say that in this era, when a highly visible disaster can trigger an 
outpouring of hundreds of millions of dollars, relief groups are under enormous pressure to disburse 
the money as quickly as possible or risk the ire of donors.”).  
 25 Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to September 11 
Overwhelmed The Law of Disaster Relief, 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 300 (2003).  
 26 Erica Pearson, Money for Rebuilding, GOTHAM GAZETTE, Feb. 3, 2002, 
http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/issueoftheweek/20030203/200/271 (describing “9/11 scam 
artists” who “invented brothers, husbands, [and] wives” in their applications to large relief funds 
which succeeded because a complete list of the dead and the families was not available until several 
months after the attacks).  
 27  Thomas Zambito, Con Artists Cashed in on $5.8M from 9/11 Tragedy, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Sept. 9, 2007.  
 28 Eric Lipton, “Breathtaking” Waste and Fraud in Hurricane Aid, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
2006.  
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investigating over 7000 possible instances of fraud.29 In New York alone, 
the Manhattan District Attorney had charged 245 people with making 
over $3 million dollars in fraudulent 9/11 relief claims.30 In another case 
after Hurricane Katrina, employees of the Red Cross schemed with 
outside individuals in order to steal money from the agency.31 All new 
disaster relief organizations that raise and disburse funds quickly face 
this particular risk of distributing aid to fraudulent applicants.32  
C. Waste  
Like all new nonprofit organizations, new disaster relief 
organizations can waste their assets as a result of weak governance, 
particularly when the board is dominated by a founder.33 In general, 
organizations run by founders are distinct from those run by successors 
because founders are often entrepreneurial as opposed to managerial.34 In 
this context, directors who attempt to engage with the founder may only 
do so in futility.35 Founder-led organizations with less board oversight of 
daily operations can be poorly managed and inefficient.36 Oftentimes, 
founder-led nonprofits are governed by family members, friends, and 
business associates despite the fact that these “interlocking relationships” 
can undermine the “the level of independent judgment required of all 
board members.”37 Particularly in disaster relief, if the founder provides 
  
 29 Id. 
 30 Edward Wyatt, More Arrests Made in 9/11 Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003.  
 31 Jacqueline L. Salmon, Fraud Alleged at Red Cross Call Centers, WASH. POST, Dec. 
27, 2005, at A5. 
 32 N.Y. ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 11 (“The public understandably has demanded that 
relief be made quickly with minimal red tape. The public has also expressed strong concerns that the 
charities take steps to avoid fraud and waste, to ensure some measure of equity in the distributions 
and to guard against any victim falling between the cracks.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 33 Boozang, supra note 7, at 124 (“Smaller nonprofits and [those] reliant on a single 
significant donor must resist the board acting as the alter ego of the entity’s founders or original 
board members. Fidelity to mission must guide all decisions, and the board is obliged to monitor 
management.”); Stephen R. Block & Steven Rosenberg, Toward an Understanding of Founder’s 
Syndrome: An Assessment of Power and Privilege Among Founders of Nonprofit Organizations, 12 
NONPROFIT MGMT. AND LEADERSHIP 353, 354 (2002) (analyzing “unhealthy organizational 
situations in which founders are more heavy-handed and indifferent about the imbalance of their 
control over organizations”). Block and Rosenberg concluded that “founders are not necessarily 
skilled managers” and that founder-led organization board members were less involved in decision-
making. Id. at 364-66.  
 34 Id. at 365.  
 35 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 169 (“Powerful group dynamics constrain the 
willingness of directors to voice concern or dissent, discouraging them from openly questioning or 
contradicting management except in extraordinary circumstances.”). 
 36 Block & Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 364 (“The new leadership that replaces the 
founder is likely to have more experience and skill in efficiently managing and maintaining an 
organization.”).  
 37 PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, PRINCIPLES FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE AND 
ETHICAL PRACTICE 23 (Reference Ed. 2007), available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/report/ 
principles/Principles_Reference.pdf [hereinafter PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR].  
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poor operational oversight,38 the new disaster relief organization will 
waste money and provide ineffective disaster relief.39 While it would not 
be desirable to completely quash the motivation and drive of visionary 
founders, governance mandates will improve disaster relief nonprofits by 
separating entrepreneurial pursuits from managerial duties.   
The short-term and long-term needs of disaster relief victims are 
best met through coordination and collaboration among the public, 
private, and non-governmental sectors.40 At least in part, such 
coordination is necessary to determine which victims need aid and which 
victims have already been served.41 Because of this, new nonprofit 
organizations have been criticized for undermining such coordination 
and collaboration.42 With no formal or centralized leadership from within 
the nonprofit sector to coordinate efforts to serve disaster victims,43 new 
nonprofit organizations with weak governance are likely to continue 
undermining disaster relief efforts. Despite condemnation of government 
relief services44 and public distrust of large charities after the Red Cross 
  
 38 Block & Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 364 (Smaller nonprofits are often solely run by 
their founders who “are less concerned with the opinions of others” and “may not be interested in the 
ideas and directional advice of others.”).  
 39 MELCHER, supra note 1, at 33; SEESSEL, supra note 12, at 9.  
 40 Gloria Simo & Angela L. Bies, The Role of Nonprofits in Disaster Response: An 
Expanded Model of Cross-Sector Collaboration, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 125, 126-32 (2007) 
(discussing the cross-sector collaboration necessary for disasters such as Hurricane Katrina); 
DISASTER RELIEF AND RECOVERY: THE ROLE OF NONPROFITS BEYOND GROUND ZERO AND THE 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR WORK 16 (Elizabeth M. Guggenheimer et al. eds., 2003) 
(“Alongside long-term plans for recovery and rebuilding from the September 11 attacks, nonprofit 
organizations throughout New York City are taking stock of lessons learned and creating plans for 
future crisis. They are recognizing the need for contingency plans to ensure that relief efforts are 
better coordinated and more effective in the event of a future large-scale disaster.”); MELCHER, 
supra note 1, at 11-12 (describing how use of existing charities reduces risk, but also conceding that 
new organizations can be innovative). 
 41 Gene Steurle, Charities and Disaster Relief, Making Choices & Planning for the 
Future, 35 TAX-EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 159, 160 (“Clearly, when many charities become involved, 
they can trip over each other. . . . [T]he small charity may believe that it enhances its own future by 
running its own little program, no matter how inefficiently. However, the sector as a whole could 
witness lesser charitable giving as a result.”).  
 42 Id. (assailing “waste” of small nonprofits that undertake disaster relief); MELCHER, 
supra note 1, at 15 (“Creating new programs poses risk and can be counterproductive. Some new 
organizations created after 9/11 had overly narrow purposes that could not keep up with quickly 
evolving needs…In a crisis, organizations may attempt actions that are beyond their capabilities and 
inconsistent with their missions.”); SEESSEL, supra note 12, at 9 (“Philanthropic planning was 
complicated by the proliferation of new charities created to address 9/11 relief and recovery, many 
of which had inexperienced leadership and vaguely defined plans.”). 
 43 MELCHER, supra note 1, at 16 (describing leadership problem that was partially 
resolved through September 11th Fund); Simo & Bies, supra note 40, at 135 (“Perceptions of 
government failure or inadequate relief efforts were widespread and described as serving to 
stimulate alternative relief and re-building solutions in the form of cross-sector collaborations.”); 
Debra Blum, Review of 9/11 Response Finds Charities Missed Opportunity to Lead, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY, Dec. 8, 2003, http://216.105.98.11/content/Practices/Practices57_2. 
 44 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE KATRINA: INEFFECTIVE FEMA 
OVERSIGHT OF HOUSING MAINTENANCE CONTRACTS IN MISSISSIPPI RESULTED IN MILLIONS OF 
DOLLARS OF WASTE AND POTENTIAL FRAUD 7 (2007) [hereinafter HURRICANE KATRINA], available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08106.pdf (concluding that FEMA improperly spent over $30 
million in government funds).  
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scandal,45 new disaster relief organizations that may fill some gap in the 
disaster response system should still be the subject of governance reform. 
D.  Unique Challenges of the Disaster Relief Context 
While all nonprofit organizations face challenges and are under-
resourced, the urgent and complex nature of disaster relief work is 
particularly prone to fraud, theft, and waste of assets when carried out by 
inexperienced staff.46 “[C]reating and managing a new charitable 
organization involves expense, administrative responsibilities, and 
attention to legal compliance obligations . . . that are likely to be complex 
and challenging.”47 The highly emotional nature of the work can lead 
staff to discontinue their work due to “burn-out.”48 In addition, the 
administrative responsibility of fundraising in the years after a disaster49 
can lead to organizational failure. For instance, none of the twelve to 
fifteen organizations founded by nonprofit “rookies” after the Oklahoma 
City bombing survived for more than two years.50 Even extremely high-
profile charities suffered after September 11th.51 When organizations that 
aspire to help victims fail shortly after inception, this raises legal and 
policy issues involving the extent to which the board could have 
prevented its failure.  
Lastly, to the extent that new disaster relief organizations are run 
by inexperienced people, they are ill-equipped to handle the diffuse, 
  
 45 Strom, supra note 3 (people wanted to form their own charities as opposed to donate 
to large charities).  
 46 Lipman, supra note 2 (“These organizations that pop up run a high risk of waste, 
inefficiency, and outright fraud. Even when you have individuals with the best intent, they are not 
experienced at raising and distributing money.” (quoting Marc Owens, head of the IRS oversight of 
nonprofits from 1999-2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Strom, supra note 3.  
 47 Betsy Buchalter Adler & Barbara A. Rosen, Disaster! Practices and Procedures for 
Charities Providing Relief After 9/11: A Case Study, 96 J. TAX’N 297, 299 (2002). 
 48 Domenica Marchetti, September 11 Charities Face Challenges Beyond the Ordinary, 
CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 7, 2002, www.philanthropy.com/free/articles/v14/i10/10001101.htm 
(“Very often there is a desire to memorialize someone . . . . But if there is no fundamental 
understanding of the issue you’re trying to address, the passion will eventually burn out and you’re 
left with a somewhat inexperienced group of people tackling something they aren’t equipped to 
tackle.” (quoting Oklahoma City Community City Foundation Executive Director Nancy B. 
Anthony) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Families of September 11, http.fos11.org (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2009).  
 49 DISASTER RELIEF AND RECOVERY, supra note 40, at 29.  
 50 Marchetti, supra note 48 (“Sustaining a charity over the long term is probably the 
biggest challenge a September 11 groups face,” one disaster relief expert stated.). 
 51 Id. The Todd Beamer Foundation sought to provide mental health support for 
traumatized children who lost a loved one in the September 11th attacks, expanded its mission to 
support children traumatized by events other than September 11th, and yet spent more on consultants 
than on services and is now faced with financial problems. Beamer Foundation Making Hard 
Choices, THE NONPROFIT TIMES, Feb. 12, 2007, http://nptimes.com/07Feb/news-070212-1.html 
(“Renamed Heroic Choices some three years ago, the organization ended 2005 with $177,539 in net 
assets, according to its most recent Form 990, down from more than $2.7 million at the same time 
two years ago, while spending more on fundraising and consultants than program services or 
contributions. The past two years have seen more than a third of the nonprofit’s $2.8 million in total 
expenses go for ‘fundraising expenses’ with less than $1 million listed for ‘program services.’”).  
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unpredictable, and often long-term nature of disaster victims’ needs.52 
Disaster relief is a comprehensive process that encompasses acute and 
long-term needs and extends well beyond the mere provision of blankets, 
food, and medical care in the days after a tragedy.53 For example, the 
attacks of September 11th took a direct toll on thousands of lives and left 
hundreds of thousands of people economically deprived and 
psychologically traumatized.54 Many relief providers in New York City 
were influenced by the response to other disasters, such as the Oklahoma 
City bombing, where the mental health needs of victims worsened as 
time went on instead of vice versa.55 Accordingly, aid encompassed cash 
assistance, loans for small businesses, government benefits, as well as 
ongoing mental healthcare for several years.56 Service providers after 
Hurricane Katrina, Rita, and Wilma similarly assisted a large evacuee 
population with short-term subsistence measures, and long-term 
assistance with housing, healthcare, mental healthcare, and education,57  
The waste of donor dollars or resources by new disaster relief 
organizations may also be rooted in, or at least partially explained by, the 
wide range of disaster relief goals. The Chronicle of Philanthropy 
reported that disaster relief organizations fast-tracked for tax-exemption 
after September 11th sought to create animal-friendly license plates in 
Missouri and Kansas, promote music education in Colorado, support 
orphans in Bangladesh, and stop bias against the practice of chiropractic 
medicine in Ohio.58 Similarly, The New York Times reported that disaster 
relief organizations fast-tracked for tax-exempt status after Hurricane 
Katrina provided leather jackets to sadomasochists and sent money to 
children in China.59 To the extent that such wide-ranging goals 
undermines donor intent after a disaster, directors of new nonprofit 
organizations should prevent this from occurring.  
  
 52 See infra Part I.C for discussion of consequences of disaster relief organization 
ineffectiveness. The best support for this proposition comes from the strong disapproval of such 
organizations by leading sector experts, lawyers, and even the Internal Revenue Service.  
 53 DISASTER RELIEF AND RECOVERY, supra note 40, at 6-10. See generally Carol J. De 
Vita & Elaine Morley, Providing Long-Term Services After Major Disasters, URBAN INST., Aug. 
2007, at 1.  
 54 SEESSEL, supra note 12, at 1 (reporting that a total of 2823 people were killed on four 
hijacked airplanes, in the Twin Towers, and at the Pentagon). In the months following the attacks, 
700 businesses closed and over 100,000 jobs were lost. Seven thousand people were displaced from 
downtown Manhattan. Id. 
 55 Id. at 5 (describing opinion of Nancy B. Anthony, Executive Director of the Oklahoma 
City Community Foundation).  
 56 DISASTER RELIEF AND RECOVERY, supra note 40, at 6-9, 13-14.  
 57 The Face of Recovery: The American Red Cross Response to Hurricane Katrina, Rita 
& Wilma, 2-9 (2007) (on file with author).  
 58 See generally IRS, DISASTER RELIEF Report, supra note 18. See infra Part II.B. for 
discussion of federal tax-exempt guidelines and expedited application process for disaster relief 
organizations; see also Harvy Lipman, IRS Handling of September 11th Charities Shows Weakness 
of Approval System, Critics Say, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 7, 2002, 
http://www.philanthropy.com/free/articles/v14/i10/10000802.htm. 
 59 Strom, supra note 3.  
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The problems outlined in this section have already been the 
subject of widespread criticism. One commentator has derided these new 
organizations as “knee-jerk reactionary efforts” that waste “money and 
administrative resources.”60 The former head of the Charity Bureau in the 
New York Attorney General’s office described new disaster relief 
organizations as follows: “I doubt they have much impact. There were 
plenty of existing, accountable vehicles for donors to give to.”61 One 
charity watchdog group urged donors to “[a]void newly-formed 
charities”62 after a disaster, and urged charities to refrain from entering 
into the field of disaster relief when other organizations already had an 
infrastructure in place.63 Similarly, a report on the role of nonprofits after 
Hurricane Katrina revealed that new disaster relief organizations actually 
created conflict among existing public and nonprofit relief providers due 
to their lack of expertise.64 Finally, despite the fast-track tax-exemption 
  
 60 JACK SIEGEL, DOING GOOD DOES NOT JUSTIFY AD HOC TAX BREAKS: LESSONS FROM 
VIRGINIA TECH, HURRICANE KATRINA, TSUNAMIS, AND OTHER TRAGEDIES (2007), 
http://www.charitygovernance.com/charity_governance/2007/04/doing_good_does.html. 
 61 Lipman, supra note 2 (quoting William Josephson, the head of the Charities Bureau in 
the N.Y. Attorney General’s office from 1999 to 2004).  
 62  Charity Navigator, 5 Lessons For Donors to Take to Heart, available at
http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=katrina.article&cpid=454 (last visited Apr. 1, 
2009). Charity Navigator offers an explanation for why new charities struggle to survive:  
Avoid newly-formed charities. While the IRS decided to legitimize anyone claiming to 
provide Katrina-related aid by fast-tracking their applications for nonprofit status, Charity 
Navigator advised donors to avoid groups that suddenly popped into existence. 
Establishing a new charity is hard enough, but in a crisis, the odds of succeeding are slim 
to none. Think of it this way: would you entrust all your savings in a financial firm that 
just opened, doesn’t even have stationery, and whose employees have no experience in 
investing money? Doubtful. Even the most ethical and well-intentioned newly formed 
organizations were doomed to fall short, as evidenced by the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund. 
Many gave to the fund under the premise that two former presidents could better provide 
aid than any other charity in existence. But even this organization ran into trouble. One 
year after Katrina hit, seven out of nine religious leaders gave up their posts as advisors, 
prompting the exodus of the executive director and revealing the organization’s struggle 
to effectively disperse its funds. 
Id.  
 63 SIEGEL, supra note 60 (“We hope that state secretaries of state are discouraging people 
from creating these new organizations. Experience has shown that these knee-jerk reactionary efforts 
often produce no results while wasting money and administrative resources. The well-intentioned 
folks behind these startups should be encouraged to donate their time or money to existing charities. 
We already have too many charities.”).  
 64  Simo & Bies, supra note 40, at 135. Simo and Bies explain the skepticism that start-up 
nonprofits face: 
In the Tulane/Canal neighborhood and in southwest Louisiana, a number of new 
nonprofits emerged in the aftermath of the storms. Although some of these new entities 
proved to be innovative and filled important gaps, a number of respondents reported 
wariness and conflict in their interactions with the new agencies, viewing them with 
suspicion and questioning their motivations. Other respondents viewed the new agencies 
as “self-appointed” and misguided in their belief that they alone were “the ones who 
would provide services because they believed no one else would, or could, do it,” 
suggesting that these new agencies suffered from naiveté and “did not understand the 
nonprofit landscape, especially in New Orleans, and basically just mucked things up—
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program implemented after September 11th and Hurricane Katrina by 
Congress,65 even the Internal Revenue Service has conceded that disaster 
relief organizations with an established infrastructure are better equipped 
to serve disaster victims. The Internal Revenue Service described 
existing charitable organizations, such as the Salvation Army, United 
Way, and Red Cross as:  
a more practical approach than the establishment of a new charitable 
organization. . . . In the rush to provide help, organizers spend time and funds 
establishing and qualifying a new charitable organization. This may be 
appropriate when the organizers have long-term goals or where no suitable 
existing charity is present.66  
The echoed sentiment of these lawyers, self-regulatory and governmental 
agencies, clearly supports the proposition that new disaster relief 
nonprofit organizations, while lawfully formed, should be required to 
have active, responsible board members who can guide the 
organization’s staff as it raises money and serves disaster victims.   
II. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW  
Nonprofit organizations are governed by state nonprofit 
corporation law and federal tax law.67 The disaster relief organization is 
typically a state incorporated nonprofit organization and a federally tax-
exempt organization.68 This Part argues that state and federal laws fail to 
enforce fiduciary duties in such a way as to make new disaster relief 
organizations more financially accountable.  
A. State Law  
Nonprofit organizations can become state incorporated entities 
for any lawful purpose and are not pre-screened by the state or the 
judiciary.69 State judicial scrutiny over the nonprofit incorporation 
process, once the norm, eroded as a result of ideological changes and 
  
creating conflicts and even ignoring other organizations that had been working in the 
neighborhoods for years. 
Id. (quoting respondents to study of nonprofit participation in disaster relief).  
 65 See infra Part II.B for discussion of IRS “expedited” process.  
 66 See IRS, DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18; see also Lipman, supra note 2 
(“When there’s a disaster, people’s first instinct is to say, ‘Let’s form an organization and collect 
money or goods. Let’s accomplish something.’ What we want people to do is take a breath and see if 
there’s an existing organization that could use their support before they go through all the expense 
related to forming a new organization. But if one does not exist, then we’re saying we will offer this 
expedited process.” (quoting Marvin Friedlander, senior manager in IRS exempt-organizations 
division) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 67 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 60-61. Part II will address the law as it relates 
to charitable organizations as opposed to mutual benefit organizations and trusts.  
 68 Katz, supra note 25, at 258.  
 69 NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR 83-115 (2001). 
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new scholarly arguments that constitutional rights of association and 
speech justified lenient rules for nonprofit formation.70 The nonprofit 
formation process mirrors that of corporations. However, unlike 
corporations, new nonprofit organizations normally incorporate and 
operate in the same state as a result of costs and the need to attract local 
donors.71 Today, as a result of the liberalization of state incorporation 
rules for nonprofit formations, new disaster relief organizations can form 
with ease despite the presence of numerous large and established public and 
nonprofit organizations already in the business of responding to disasters.72 
1. Fiduciary Duties 
State law requires that board members abide by the duties of 
care, loyalty, and obedience. The duty of care merely obligates board 
members to make reasonably informed decisions, act in good faith, and 
carry out their role with the care of an “ordinarily prudent person.”73 The 
duty of loyalty requires board members to act in the best interests of the 
organization and bars them from engaging in a self-dealing transaction 
carried out at the expense of the organization.74 Accordingly, fiduciaries 
must make decisions with objectivity and receive approval from the 
corporation to complete any transaction involving a conflict of interest 
that impairs their objectivity.75 Lastly, the duty of obedience requires 
directors to faithfully carry out the goals of the organization.76 In general, 
  
 70 Id. (discussing how the civil rights and women’s movements led to greater mainstream 
appreciation of the role that marginalized groups play in a strong political democracy when they are 
allowed to formally associate with one another through nonprofit legal entities).  
 71 Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation of 
Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 767, 787 (2007); Jenkins, supra note 6, at 1165-68.  
 72 Lipman, supra note 2.  
 73 REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (RMNCA) § 8.30 (1987) (“A director shall 
discharge his or her duties as a director, including his or her duties as a member of a committee: (1) 
in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation.”). The American Bar Association’s RMNCA (1987) was adopted in twenty-three 
states and its original version (1952) was adopted in six states and the District of Columbia. PANEL 
ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 37, at 22; N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a) 
(2005) (providing that “[d]irectors and officers shall discharge the duties of their respective positions 
in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would 
exercise under similar circumstances in like positions”); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 167.  
 74 RMNCA § 8.31 (1987) (barring directors from engaging in a transaction where they 
have a direct or indirect financial interest unless it is disclosed to and approved by the board); N.Y. 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 715 (2005) (when a board member has a “substantial financial 
interest” in a transaction it must be disclosed in good faith to the rest of the board); FISHMAN & 
SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 176-79.  
 75 Steven R. Smith, Directors and Officers: On Behalf of the Board, in THE NONPROFIT 
LEGAL LANDSCAPE 26-27 (Thomas K. Hyatt ed., 2005).  
 76 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 219 (describing how a director may be sued if 
a corporation enters into an ultra vires transaction that is not contemplated by its governing legal 
documents); Smith, supra note 75, at 26.  
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the duty of obedience is less important today in order to allow a 
nonprofit organizations to operate with flexibility.77  
The duties of care and loyalty are not meaningful constraints on 
management for numerous reasons.78 The duty of care is ambiguous 
because state statutes do not clearly specify the extent to which a board 
member should monitor the activities of the organization.79 The duty of 
loyalty is difficult to enforce because conflicts of interest are extremely 
common in the nonprofit sector.80 More significantly, donors and 
consumers of nonprofit services do not have a private right of action 
against a nonprofit’s directors.81 Finally, while the duties of care and 
loyalty can be enforced by state Attorneys General in lieu of donors and 
consumers, enforcement by the public sector is rare.   
2. Enforcement by State Attorneys General 
Despite its limited resources, prosecution by the charity bureau 
of the state Attorney General for fiduciary duty violations is the most 
valuable state regulatory constraint over nonprofits.82 The Red Cross 
scandal illustrates this fact. Just after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, the Red Cross created the “Liberty Fund,” which, rather than 
merely assisting September 11th victims, more closely resembled a “war 
  
 77 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 219 (describing the duty of obedience as 
analogous to the “emasculated” ultra vires doctrine in corporate law); Linda Sugin, Resisting The 
Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 893, 897 (2007) (explaining that fiduciary “duty of obedience” has become the “stepchild” of 
nonprofit fiduciary duties because charity goals simply could not be met if nonprofits were held to 
such a narrow, rigid standard, and arguing for a more flexible duty of obedience standard).  
 78 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 149 (“The fiduciary obligation is notably 
elusive as a concept. The particular duties it imposes vary in different contexts, as does the 
justification for imposing the obligation itself.”).  
 79 Karyn R. Vanderwarren, Note, Financial Accountability in Charitable Organizations: 
Mandating an Audit Committee Function, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 963, 968 (2002) (“Noticeably 
absent from the Model Act are any expectations that directors ensure that management is engaging 
in sound practices.”). 
 80  FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 176-78 (“Conflicts of interest, divided 
loyalties, and transactions among directors, officers, and charitable corporations abound in the 
nonprofit sector. Breaches of loyalty are not only much easier to identify than breaches of care, they 
are more prevalent.” Typical breaches may include using the organization’s property for more than 
de minimis personal use and paying high salaries to directors that are not in the best interest of the 
organization.).  
 81 Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the 
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 466-67 (1996) 
(“[B]ecause of the lack of classes of private persons with standing to sue, in many ways this 
fiduciary duty is really a legal obligation without a legal sanction.”) (footnotes omitted); Evelyn 
Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable Donor Standing, 41 
GA. L. REV. 1183, 1188 (2007) (“[T]he traditional rule that a donor lacks standing to complain in 
court about a charitable donee’s use of a restricted gift can baffle and even infuriate.”); Manne, 
supra note 9, at 236.  
 82 Manne, supra note 9, at 251 (“The attorney general is the most important, and 
probably least well-equipped, source of enforcement in the charitable sector.”).  
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fund” for new, imminent terrorist attacks and possible military action.83 
This was a departure from the typical practice, used for more than a 
century of serving disaster victims, where the Red Cross had put all 
donations into one general, multi-disaster fund.84 Donors, media, and 
Congress scrutinized and condemned the broader purpose of the Liberty 
Fund.85 The Attorney General of New York accused the Red Cross of 
acting fraudulently and ordered the agency to spend its funds on only 
9/11 victims’ families.86 The agency soon changed its position and 
allocated all present and future donations to the Liberty Fund—over $1 
billion—to the short and long-term needs of victims’ families.87  
The New York Attorney General’s actions represented a rare 
example of a threat of prosecution against a charity for violating its duty 
of care, which encompasses the obligation to honor the intent of donors.88 
Yet, fiduciary duty violations in the nonprofit sector are said to occur 
elsewhere “with unsettling frequency.”89 Prosecution by state Attorneys 
General occurs on behalf of the public only in extreme cases due to 
limited staff and resources. 90 Extreme lapses commonly include cases of 
intentional wrongdoing, such as embezzlement, by a nonprofit staff or 
board member,91 whereas fraudulent aid applicants are themselves 
prosecuted by the district attorney pursuant to criminal law. Lastly, 
Attorneys General have incentives not to prosecute problems in the 
  
 83 Katz, supra note 25, at 308-09 (“When she created the Liberty Fund, Dr. Bernadine 
Healy believed that future terrorist attacks were imminent, and that the United States Government 
was mobilizing for military action. She was summoning the agency to shift into war mode, and to do 
so on a scale not seen since the world wars. In this respect, the Liberty Fund was a war fund. Its 
monies were restricted in the sense that they would only be used to support agency activities related 
to preparing and responding to anti-U.S. terrorist attacks and U.S. military action. The Red Cross 
retained discretion to allocate funds among this broad set of activities as it saw fit.”) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
 84 Deborah Sontag, Who Brought Bernadine Healy Down?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 81 (“Since the Red Cross can raise serious money only in the wake of a high-
profile disaster, it uses the high-profile disasters to beef up general disaster-relief funds. . . . This 
practice of the Red Cross has come under fire many times—after the San Francisco earthquake of 
1989, the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995, the Red River floods of 1997, the wildfires in the San 
Diego area last January.”).  
 85 Katz, supra note 25, at 312.  
 86 Id. at 316-18 (discussing the difficulty in ascertaining donor intent).  
 87 Id. at 280-81(explaining that that despite the broad discretion given to charities to 
spend the money the way that they want, and despite the Internal Revenue Service’s initial 
reluctance to allow victims’ families to receive funds even when they were not financially needy, the 
Red Cross scandal prompted a change in tax law).  
 88 Id. at 280, 287.  
 89 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 150.  
 90 Brody, supra note 81, at 486 (discussing Attorney General standing in place of 
shareholders but only in the “extreme case of malfeasance”); Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to 
Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 559, 598 (2005) (discussing that state AGs offices have very limited resources); see 
also Boozang, supra note 7, at 115-16 (“[A]ttorneys general have great difficulty obtaining 
information about nonprofit corporations’ internal operations, and most states are functionally and 
financially incapable of dealing with anything but the most egregious nonprofit behavior.”); Manne, 
supra note 9, at 237.  
 91 Fishman, supra note 7, at 236.  
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nonprofit sector aggressively. They are elected by the public and pursue 
nonprofit cases when it is politically advantageous.92 Yet, the public is 
rarely interested in seeing do-gooders prosecuted. The New York Attorney 
General’s role in pressuring the Red Cross to allocate all of its 9/11 
donations for the aftermath of that disaster was unique in that regard.93  
Even if a suit is brought against directors of a disaster relief 
organization, the business judgment rule provides significant protection 
from liability for “unwise or erroneous” decisions.94 Further 
strengthening this shield from liability is the fact that it is difficult to link 
a director to any damage done to the organization because a nonprofit 
organization lacks a “bottom line” of profit.95 Even if the business 
judgment rule did not apply, rigorous enforcement of fiduciary duty 
obligations would likely not be pursued due to policy considerations, 
including the fact that the threat of litigation against nonprofit fiduciaries 
interferes with everyday decision-making,96 impedes innovation,97 and 
deters people from volunteering to join boards.98 Thus, relying on state 
Attorneys General to enforce the fiduciary duties of new disaster relief 
organizations does not prevent the fraud, theft, and waste that may 
plague such organizations.   
B.  Federal Tax Law  
Nonprofit governance is under the jurisdiction of state law. Yet, 
federal tax law can indirectly enforce state fiduciary duty law more 
effectively than state law or state Attorneys General because the Internal 
Revenue Services screens applications for tax-exempt status and 
examines tax returns.99 While the entire tax code does not even include 
the word “governance,” the Internal Revenue Service is becoming more 
  
 92 Manne, supra note 9, at 251.  
 93 Katz, supra note 25, at 258, 312; SEESSEL, supra note 12, at 32 (describing the “public 
outcries” over the Red Cross allocation of money for future disasters though it had been soliciting 
funds for what people thought was an exclusively 9/11-related “Project Liberty” Fund).  
 94 Smith, supra note 75, at 28; Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley 
Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 232 (2004).  
 95 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 142 (“The bottom line, the talisman of profit-
seeking activity, is easier to measure than nonprofit effectiveness.”).  
 96 Katz, supra note 25, at 279-80 (discussing how courts do not order nonprofits to spend 
their money in particular ways based on the deference to nonprofits under the “best judgment rule,” 
the nonprofit analogue to the private sector “business judgment rule”).  
 97 Brakman Reiser, supra note 94, at 231-33.  
 98  FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 157-58 (describing the “widespread attitude 
that nonprofit directors are essentially volunteers, and aggressive attempts to enforce their 
responsibilities are inappropriate and will discourage individuals from board service” and 
concluding that “courts and attorneys general tend to be overly solicitous of directors, which may 
explain why so few cases reach trial”).  
 99 Fishman, supra note 7, at 265 (“Though the attorney general historically has been 
responsible for charities’ accountability, because of a lack of resources, the IRS has become the 
primary regulator of nonprofit behavior. The IRS’s Division of Tax-Exempt and Government 
Entities is responsible for regulatory oversight.”). 
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involved in promoting good governance due to the belief that it will lead 
to tax law compliance.100  
1. Weak Enforcement  
Three main tax rules could make disaster relief organizations 
more financially accountable and effective: the bar against private 
benefit, the bar against inurement, and the intermediate sanctions rule. 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Federal Internal Revenue Code provides that a 
tax-exempt organization must be organized for charitable purposes.101 
Accordingly, tax-exempt disaster relief organizations must serve the 
poor, distressed, or underprivileged.102 Tax-exempt organizations are 
barred from allowing any person with a personal or private interest in the 
organization to receive any undue financial benefit.103 Similarly, a they 
are barred from allowing any disinterested outsider to receive a 
substantial financial benefit even if it is incidental to the charitable 
operation of the organization.104 Violations of either rule can lead to 
revocation of tax-exempt status.105 As an alternative to revocation of its 
tax-exempt status, an organization may merely receive penalties for any 
“excess economic benefits” under the intermediate sanctions rule.106 
However, this penalty is only imposed after there has been some misuse 
of funds and does not preempt fraud, theft, and waste of funds.107   
 
2. New Governance Reporting  
 
Federal tax reporting requirements are, by their very nature, 
unable to deter fraud, theft, and waste and do not incentivize compliance 
with fiduciary duties so as to prevent such malfeasance from occurring.108 
Ongoing compliance for tax-exempt status requires the filing of a Form 
990 tax return that declares income, assets, expenses, fundraising 
  
 100 See Remarks of Steven T. Miller, Commissioner of Tax and Government Entities of 
the Internal Revenue Service, Given at the Panel on Nonprofit Governance at the Western 
Conference on Tax Exempt Organizations in Los Angeles, California (November 20, 2008), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/stm_loyolagovernance_112008.pdf [hereinafter IRS Commissioner 
Speech] (describing the IRS’s new involvement in governance).  
 101 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).  
 102 IRS DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18, at 4.  
 103 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2007).   
 104 Id. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1), 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii) (2007).  
 105 Id.; see supra note 103. 
 106 I.R.C. § 4958 (2006); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 476 (“Historically, the 
Service has invoked the inurement limitation only in the most egregious cases of insider conduct. 
Since the only sanction was the ultimate death sentence—revocation of exemption—enforcement 
was lax.”).  
 107 SILBER, supra note 69, at 151-58 (arguing that regulation of organizations should not 
be based on federal tax law, which primarily reviews revenue, and does not look for other problems).  
 108 Id.  
1268 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3  
expenses, and a list of the highest paid salaries.109 Medium to large 
organizations that fail to file a Form 990 are fined, but only a continuous 
failure to file will result in the revocation of an organization’s tax-
exempt status.110 Small organizations with budgets of less than $25,000 
that were not previously required to file a Form 990 tax return are now 
required to file an “electronic postcard” tax return and will similarly have 
tax-exempt status revoked if they do not do this for three years.111 To the 
extent that reporting requirements deter malfeasance, the public remains 
unable to sue even if the itemized financial information, made available 
to the public, allowed for allegations of fraud, theft, or waste.112  
In a major new initiative to promote good governance practices, 
the Internal Revenue Service revised the annual Form 990 to include a 
detailed set of questions about governance, management, and 
disclosure.113 An entire section in the new annual tax return form includes 
questions about internal controls and the board’s composition, 
compensation, and independence.114 “We care about governance because 
we believe . . . that a well-governed organization is more likely to be 
compliant with the tax law, while poor governance can easily lead to 
trouble.”115 The agency commissioner also remarked that the IRS would 
enter into a “dialogue” and make “recommend[ations]” with an 
organization about good governance practices whether or not there was a 
link between governance and a tax law compliance problem.116  
Additionally, the commissioner stated that the IRS would use new software 
in 2009 that would ask tax-exempt status applicants questions about 
governance in order to educate and promote good governance practices at 
the outset of the tax-exemption process.117 It is unclear to what extent the 
IRS can require organizations to have certain governance structures in 
place.118   
  
 109 IRS, COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) PUBLIC CHARITIES 5-10, 18 (2006-2007), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221pc [hereinafter IRS COMPLIANCE GUIDE]; 
Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 969.  
 110 IRS COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 109, at 10.  
 111 Id. at 9-10.  
 112 Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 974.  
 113 IRS Commissioner Speech, supra note 100.  
 114 IRS Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2009); see also Aprill, supra note 71, at 
784; IRS, IRS Releases Final 2008 Form 990 for Tax-Exempt Organizations, Adjusts Filing 
Thresholds to provide Transition Relief, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/ 
0,,id=176722,00.html (describing the IRS’s interest in having nonprofits “explain their activities” in 
more detail).  
 115 IRS Commissioner Speech, supra note 100, at 3.  
 116 Id. at 5.  
 117 See id. at 6.  
 118  Christopher Quay & Fred Stokeld, IRS’s Lerner Details Discussion Draft of Resigned 
Form 990, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 15, 2007 (“It is relevant to both ask whether the IRS should be 
incentivizing behavior which is not required by the Internal Revenue Code and for which there is no 
direct connection to requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.” (quoting Suzanne Ross McDowell, 
Steptoe & Johnson LLP) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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3. Disaster Relief Compliance with Tax-Exempt Criteria  
All disaster relief organizations have to abide by specific criteria, 
though no federal enforcement that is specifically tailored to the disaster 
relief context ensures that these criteria are met. To apply for tax-exempt 
status, one need only fill out a formal application and provide a 
description, with supporting documents, of the organization’s current and 
future financial activities, services, and governance structure.119 A new 
organization that has been incorporated to serve victims of disasters can 
apply for tax-exempt status when its serves a charitable purpose fulfilled 
through assistance to disaster relief victims.120  
According to an IRS publication, the disaster relief organization 
must abide by three main criteria.121 First, the organization must provide 
aid to a “large or indefinite” charitable class in such a way as to benefit a 
community that has been affected by a disaster, as opposed to a few 
injured individuals hurt in an accident.122 For example, in the case of 
September 11th, the narrowest legal class involves families of groups 
such as uniformed personnel, those on the airplanes, or those killed in the 
World Trade Center.123 A more expansive and acceptably defined class 
might include low-wage workers or displaced residents of lower 
Manhattan.124 Second, the organization must establish and use a “needy 
or distressed test” that objectively evaluates individual victims to 
determine whether they are financially needy at the time of the grant.125 
Third, the organization must maintain records demonstrating that the 
assistance was provided to meet a victim’s particular needs.126 Even a 
wealthy disaster victim could be “needy and distressed” in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster and a relief organization could lawfully provide 
that victim with blankets, food, and crisis counseling.127 Documentation 
should describe the aid, why it was given, the charity’s objective criteria 
of a victim’s needs, how that analysis was done for each victim, contact 
information and award size for each victim, and disclosure of any 
relationship between an assisted victim and an organizational insider.128  
The problem with the needy and distressed test is that the IRS 
defers to the organization to analyze and provide relief for victims in a 
  
 119 PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 37, at 10.  
 120 Adler & Rosen, supra note 47, at 297; see IRS DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 
18, at 2.  
 121 IRS DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18, at 5-10; see also Katz, supra note 25, at 
259-61.  
 122 IRS, DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18, at 5-7; Catherine E. Livingston, 
Disaster Relief Activities of Charitable Organizations, 35 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 153, 156 (2002).  
 123 See Katz, supra note 25, at 267.  
 124 See id.  
 125 IRS DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18, at 7-8.  
 126 Id. at 9-10.  
 127 Id. at 7.  
 128 Id. at 9-10.  
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way that furthers the charitable purpose of the organization.129 As a 
result, disaster relief organizations run by inexperienced people have 
latitude in how to disburse funds and can be particularly prone to fraud, 
theft, and waste. The organization must simply use its best efforts to 
further its charitable purpose and evaluate “all pertinent circumstances” 
of a victim’s financial situation to avoid bestowing upon them the 
impermissible private financial benefit.130 Nonprofits do not have any 
obligation to make victims “whole” again,131 yet disaster relief 
organizations may use the needy and distressed test to provide wealthy 
victims with longer-term assistance in the form of services.132  
Finally, two further legal developments impacted the field of 
nonprofit disaster relief work. First, the relaxation of the needy and 
distressed test in 2001 enabled disaster relief organizations to provide 
cash to wealthy victims who were no longer needy and distressed as the 
test was traditionally construed.133 While not enacted after later disasters, 
the new law established an ongoing social norm that disaster relief 
organizations’ proper and effective role is to raise and expeditiously give 
away money to a narrow class of victims.134 Second, an expedited tax-
exempt process established after September 11th and Hurricane Katrina 
has reinforced a social norm that disaster relief organizations can be run 
by inexperienced people despite the existence of established, existing 
disaster relief organizations. Any individual, regardless of past 
professional experience, can easily form a federally tax-exempt nonprofit 
corporation to serve victims of a disaster.  
  
 129 Id. at 8 (“A charitable organization is responsible for taking into account the charitable 
purposes for which it was formed, the public benefit of its activities, and the specific needs and 
resources of each victim when using its discretion to distribute its funds.”).  
 130 Id. at 11; Katz, supra note 25, at 263-64 (“In addition to aiding a sufficient number of 
persons, a charity cannot provide too much aid relative to the charitable goals that it ostensibly 
advances. . . . More broadly, an exempt organization cannot provide excess benefits to any private 
entity or individual, including organizational outsiders. This is known as the ‘private benefit’ 
doctrine.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 131 Id. at 7-8 (emphasizing that disaster relief aid is not tantamount to providing 
something akin to insurance payouts); Katz, supra note 25, at 271 (“[D]isaster relief is not 
insurance.”); Livingston, supra note 122, at 156. 
 132 IRS DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18, at 7.  
 133 Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2006); IRS DISASTER 
RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18, at 7, 10-11. This resulted in families of 9/11 victims receiving 
approximately $1.78 million each. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Monday, December 22, 
Is Deadline to File Claim in September 11th Victim Compensation Fund (Dec. 18, 2003), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/December/03_civ_708.htm (“The average amount of 
compensation paid to date to the families of those who died on September 11 is $1.78 million. 
Individual death compensation amounts have ranged from $250,000 to $6.9 million. Those 
physically injured as a result of the attacks have received Fund compensation ranging from $500 to 
$7.9 million.”).  
 134 Stephanie Strom, Here’s My Check, Spend It All at Once, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008 
(providing support for the proposition that after a disaster donors now expect to direct their funds 
wherever they choose despite the fact that the victims may not need additional funds and the 
organization may need to use funds for another purpose).  
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Through the disaster-relief specific expedited process, 
individuals have received tax-exempt status in a mere few days,135 rather 
than sixty days or six months in the normal application and approval 
process.136 The goal of the expedited process is to allow nonprofit 
providers to raise money through a tax-exempt organization to meet the 
unmet needs of disaster victims.137 While the number of disaster relief 
groups formed through the expedited process represents a small number 
of the total applications approved for tax-exempt status every year, the 
policy has received heavy criticism.138 Because the federal law and 
regulations have allowed formation of new disaster relief organizations 
run by inexperienced people, governance reform is needed to  ensure that 
these organizations reduce the potential for theft, fraud, and waste.  
III. PROPOSED FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE IN NEW 
DISASTER RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS 
Part III proposes that new disaster relief organizations can be 
effectively regulated by a financial oversight board committee 
specifically geared to reducing theft, fraud, and waste.139 This Part 
describes the type of comprehensive financial oversight committee tasks 
that may improve the financial accountability of new disaster relief 
organizations and considers the limits of such a proposal. This Part 
further considers the advantages and limitations to the enforcement of the 
financial oversight committee by public agencies, accrediting agencies, 
and large funders. Part III ultimately argues that despite the limitations 
discussed, the prevention of theft, fraud, and waste will improve the 
accountability of new disaster relief organizations, better meet the acute 
  
 135 See IRS DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18, at 3 (requiring only a cover letter 
and brief description of the disaster and explaining why there is a need for urgent processing of tax-
exempt status); Strom, supra note 3 (describing how an organization called “Drop Yer Drawers” 
received tax-exempt status within eight days after applying, and another organization, Angel Pray 
Child Charity Foundation, of Pennsylvania, received tax-exempt status in fifteen days though as of 
2006 it had not served any children victimized in the Hurricane). 
 136 Strom, supra note 3.  
 137 IRS DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18, at 2-3; Where Most Needed, IRS Too 
Responsive after Katrina, Say Critics, http://www.wheremostneeded.org/2006/03/irs_too_respons.html 
(Mar. 15, 2006).  
 138 Where Most Needed, supra note 137 (describing how IRS adds 80,000 new 
organizations per year); see also Lipman, supra note 2; Strom, supra note 3; supra Part I.D 
(describing new organizations that received expedited tax-exempt status, and criticism of the 
expedited process).  
 139 FRANCIE OSTROWER, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDINGS ON 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM THE FIRST NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE STUDY 16 
(2007), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411479_Nonprofit_Governance.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2008) (concluding that even though small nonprofit organizations reported to the 
study that they would have difficulty implementing governance reforms, “[h]aving organizational 
members that elect one or more board members was positively associated with activity in multiple 
internal and externally oriented roles (e.g., fundraising, financial oversight, planning, monitoring 
programs, setting policy)”). 
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and long-term needs of disaster victims, and restore the nonprofit 
sector’s tarnished reputation.   
A. Overview 
The financial oversight committee should primarily ensure that a 
new disaster relief organization has systems in place to assess and 
manage the risks involved in receiving and allocating large sums of 
money.140 The concept of a financial oversight committee improves upon 
existing reforms that call for audit committees only when an organization 
reaches a certain size.141 Instead, a board committee focused on financial 
oversight should be mandated regardless of the organization’s size. Such 
a mandate should be enforced through government agencies, self-
regulatory bodies, and large funders because current legal channels 
cannot ensure financial accountability until after fraud, theft, or waste 
have already occurred.142  
While the formalization of a board committee specializing in 
financial oversight may be the most traditional type of governance 
reform in terms of mirroring governance structures required in publicly 
held corporations,143 it is also the most appropriate governance reform for 
new disaster relief organizations precisely as a result of its 
“concreteness.”144 This will ground the board in refining policies and 
procedures around one metric, as opposed to metrics that are hard to 
define such as whether or not the organization is best serving disaster 
relief victims. Moreover, the clear delineation of responsibilities among 
board members, a rarity in new nonprofit organizations,145 may even 
  
 140 Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 986-87 (persuasively arguing how a formalized audit 
committee can prevent theft at small organizations despite the fact that it is widely assumed that 
small organizations do not need formalized board committees).  
 141 The California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 requires nonprofit organizations to 
have an audit committee comprised of people who do not serve as staff members when gross 
revenues reach $2 million per fiscal year. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586(e)(2) (West 2009); Aprill, 
supra note 71, at 770-73 (describing how the Nonprofit Integrity Act requires an audit committee for 
organizations with revenue of $2 million per year, whereas the  Panel on the Nonprofit Sector had 
proposed that organizations with revenues of $1 million per year should have audit committees, and 
the Senate had proposed that organizations with revenue of just $250,000 per year should have audit 
committees).  
 142 Analyses of how to enforce reforms through public and private channels is common in 
nonprofit legal scholarship. For some examples of these analyses, see Fishman, supra note 7, at 272-
75 (arguing for state “charity commissions” situated in each judicial district and composed of private 
citizens appointed by the governor); Mark Sidel, The Guardians Guarding Themselves: A 
Comparative Perspective on Nonprofit Self-Regulation, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 830-34 (2005) 
(lauding the self-regulatory standards established by the Maryland Council of Nonprofit 
Associations); Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 987 (arguing that governance oversight can 
potentially prevent scandals).  
 143 Brakman Reiser, supra note 94, at 258-68. New governance requirements proposed in 
New York and Massachusetts, and incorporated into in California law, were based on Sarbanes-
Oxley corporate requirements of board composition, committees and duties. Id.  
 144 Cf. id. at 222 (describing the “concreteness” of financial accountability as suitable 
focus of the Attorney General). 
 145 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 218.  
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trigger the formation of similar committees in other areas of governance 
and provide for an altogether better board of directors.146  
1. Composition 
First, the financial oversight committee should be comprised of 
“independent” members. This requirement responds to the assumption 
that a dispassionate and objective perspective results in improved 
decision-making and financial accountability.147 Board members are 
considered independentwhen they are not employed by the organization, 
receive no financial compensation from the organization, and are not in the 
immediate family of other board or staff members.148 The need for 
independent directors reflects an ongoing debate in corporate and nonprofit 
law.149 Therefore, the requirement of a financial oversight committee 
composed of independent members at even new disaster relief organizations 
would be consistent with some state laws and recent governance proposals.  
The ever-present problem of how to form this committee at a 
small organization150 could be solved by allowing the committee to be 
flexibly comprised of any number of board members that best suits the 
size of the organization.151 In fact, disasters may provide the best 
environment for new organizations to be connected to independent 
financial oversight committee members. Because disasters galvanize 
emotion and support, new organizations may have access to numerous 
pro bono, financially literate volunteers who want to help victims in a 
meaningful way.152 Accordingly, financial oversight committees might 
  
 146 Boozang, supra note 7, at 131 (“A strong and qualified board will work only if it 
knows what is really going on inside the organization.”). 
 147 Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Independence in the Independent Sector, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 795, 809-10 (2007).  
 148  PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 37, at 23 (proposing that two-thirds of 
the board of a charity should be  “independent” in that they (1) do not receive compensation as an 
employee, (2) do not receive compensation that is determined by someone who is compensated by 
the organization, (3) do not stand to materially, financially benefit from the organization, and (4) are 
not related to and do not live with individuals described in (1),(2) or (3)).  
 149 See supra notes 145-147; see supra note 37 (proposing a supermajority of independent 
directors who meet certain criteria). In contrast, New Hampshire requires that all boards comprise a 
minimum of five members who are not “of the same immediate family or related by blood or 
marriage.” N.H. REV. STAT. § 292.6-a (1999); California requires that not more than forty-nine 
percent of a board may be “interested,” in that they cannot be compensated by the organization or 
cannot be a “brother, sister, ancestor, descendant, spouse, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law, 
daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, or father-in-law” of any compensated person. CAL. CORP. CODE. § 
5227 (2009).  
 150 OSTROWER, supra note 139, at 22 (describing how small organizations have reported 
themselves to have difficulty implementing governance mandates).  
 151 Boozang, supra note 7, at 129 (endorsing as least a few “formally designated” 
monitoring directors to improve governance); Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 983 (describing how 
a committee convened specifically to monitor the external auditor does not need to be  “one-size-
fits-all”).  
 152 Id. at 770 (describing how criticism of independent director requirements has centered 
on the low likelihood that anyone would have “adequate time, incentives, and information to conduct 
effective oversight” (internal quotations omitted)).  
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easily draw members from accountant trade associations who are able to 
fulfill the committee roles with very little training and oversight.153 
Finally, in a new disaster relief organization with a sizable budget, a 
committee with multiple board members may be appropriate. However, 
even in a new and small disaster relief organization, the financial 
oversight committee function could be accomplished through even one 
board member.  
B. How a Financial Oversight Committee Will Mitigate Theft, 
Fraud, and Waste 
1. Reduced Theft and Fraud 
The committee should guide the staff and board in the decision-
making process so that the organization spends funds in accordance with 
tax-exempt guidelines.154 Because the circumstances in which new 
disaster relief organizations operate allow inexperienced managers and 
staff easy access to liquid assets,155 it is imperative that such liquid assets 
are not solely received and spent through the “complete and unchecked 
access” of management and staff.156 In doing so, financial oversight 
committees should strive to check the behavior of the grief-stricken 
disaster relief executive director who, in receiving checks left and right, 
can siphon funds away.157 Additionally, if the organization provides cash 
assistance that requires a needy and distressed test analysis,158 the 
financial oversight committee should regularly review how that analysis 
is being done. At a minimum, the financial oversight committee should 
be educated and trained to understand that the unique circumstances of 
disaster aftermath can lead an organization to experience a cash windfall, 
and appreciate the risk involved in rushing to provide aid to individuals 
whose claims may be fraudulent. 
2. Reduced Waste 
Through continuous review of policies and procedures grounded 
in receiving and allocating money, the financial oversight committee will 
also serve a programmatic function. The committee should decide which 
programs to fund in order to protect the long-term health of the 
organization. This requirement would essentially formalize the 
  
 153 Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 981 (“Many CPA societies have a public interest 
section geared at helping small nonprofit organizations recruit board members.”).  
 154 IRS DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18, at 5-8 (describing the requirements of 
analyzing needy and distressed victims, and recording the information adequately).  
 155 See supra Part II.A for a description of embezzlement by the founding director of a 
new disaster relief organization.  
 156 Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 983.  
 157 Barron, supra note 19.  
 158 IRS DISASTER RELIEF REPORT, supra note 18, at 7.  
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recommendation made by existing regulators that board members should 
evaluate programs,159 particularly in the wake of a disaster. Additionally, 
an independent financial oversight committee should oversee how money 
is spent by highly charged, emotional, and even grief-stricken staff 
members.  
Critics of board committee requirements contend that nonprofits 
should spend their resources on more process-oriented reforms.160 The 
nonprofit sector is already resource-strapped and new organizations may 
be less inclined to expend resources on implementing novel governance 
practices.161 Additionally, donors might dislike the fact that disaster relief 
organizations will focus on governance, not victims.162 However, the 
promulgation of sector-wide standards for a financial oversight 
committee, especially if enforced effectively,163 may diffuse donors’ 
anxieties about more Red Cross type scandals and enable new disaster 
relief organizations to form and rely on financial oversight committees.   
Finally, while some optimism in the less bureaucratic channels 
of small disaster relief organizations is warranted,164 this should not be 
taken to mean that no governance committee is necessary. Small, new 
disaster relief organizations providing cash assistance might screen 
victims more carefully than a large organization like FEMA or the Red 
Cross in order to eliminate fraudulent applicants. However, small 
nonprofit organizations are as likely, if not more so, to experience theft 
and waste of funds as larger nonprofit organizations.165 Furthermore, the 
intimacy and informality of small nonprofits warrant a greater need for 
  
 159 ANDREW CUOMO, INTERNAL CONTROLS AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR NOT-
FOR-PROFIT BOARDS 12-13 (2007), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/charities/ 
pdfs/internal_controls.pdf.  
 160 See generally Mulligan, supra note 8; see also Aprill, supra note 71, at 771; Brakman 
Reiser, supra note 90, at 593.  
 161 Nonprofit legal scholars commonly argue that government regulation of nonprofit 
governance leads to agency costs that may detract from the money spent on the mission. For 
examples of these arguments, see Brakman Reiser, supra note 90, at 586 (“If the burdens of 
compliance with regulation push nonprofits to scale back their programs or force them out of 
existence, beneficiaries, communities, and society will bear a real loss.”); Manne, supra note 9, at 
244 (condemning costs bound to be incurred by nonprofits through state review boards); Mulligan, 
supra note 8; Wendy K. Szymanski, An Allegory of Good (and Bad) Governance: Applying the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit Governance, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1303, 1316-20 (2003) 
(government mandated board duties designed for private corporations are inapplicable to nonprofits 
that depend on donations for operating costs).  
 162 Strom, supra note 134 (providing timely support for the proposition that donors 
following a disaster do not want their money going to the organization’s overhead or administrative 
expenses). 
 163 See infra Parts III.A-C for a discussion of how various entities may offer effective 
enforcement of a financial oversight committee function within new disaster relief organizations.  
 164 Small nonprofit organizations are generally more community-oriented and therefore 
can interact in a more flexible way with victims of a disaster. See DISASTER RELIEF AND RECOVERY, 
supra note 40, at 8 (“Nonprofits organizations with roots in the community are well-positioned to 
provide appropriate services, such as skills training, resume services and job placement, and to take 
advantage of wage subsidies.”).  
 165 Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 986-87 (describing the “small-time scandal” of 
Illinois Federation of Families, where nearly $50,000 was stolen); Barron, supra note 19.  
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segregation of duties and a financial oversight committee that prevents 
management’s unchecked access to funds.166 No governance reform can 
guarantee an end to theft, fraud, and waste. However, board members 
with a “blueprint”167 of how to run a good organization with strong 
accounting practices and internal controls are unequivocally in a better 
position to mitigate and prevent such problems.168  
C. Enforcement 
1. Government Enforcement 
New state statutes requiring financial oversight committees for 
such a narrow category of nonprofit activity is unlikely. However, public 
sector agencies should mandate the formation of financial oversight 
committees in the boards of directors of new disaster relief organizations. 
This would formally integrate the federal and state governments’ liberal 
tax-exempt and incorporation laws, respectively, with their own 
recommendations for good governance practices.169 Such heightened 
fiduciary duties might be effectively enforced by the Internal Revenue 
Service or state Attorneys General.  
The federal government can successfully enforce a financial 
oversight committee at a new disaster relief organization for various 
reasons. First, the federal government already regulates financial 
reporting of tax-exempt organizations,170 it has already recommended 
standards for good governance for tax-exempt organizations,171 it already 
regulates governance requirements in publicly-traded corporations,172 and 
it already leads disaster relief efforts through the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). However, it is likely too farfetched to 
suggest that a blending of all of these responsibilities would occur at the 
federal level. While commentators have advocated the creation of a 
federal agency that regulates nonprofit governance analogous to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the day has not yet come.173 The 
  
 166 OSTROWER, supra note 139, at 22 (“Smaller nonprofits that engage in financial 
transactions need to have more formal policies in place . . . .”); Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 983. 
 167 Brakman Reiser, supra note 90, at 590.  
 168 Id. (discussing how internal controls, when defined, can “provide a blueprint for how 
to accomplish such improvements . . . by demanding the creation of individualized internal controls 
within organizations”). 
 169 See IRS, GOVERNANCE AND RELATED TOPICS—501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS 8, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance_practices.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2009) 
(“[A] charity with substantial assets or revenue should consider obtaining an audit of its financial 
statements by an independent auditor. The board may establish an independent audit committee to 
select and oversee an independent auditor.”). 
 170  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 171 Id.; Aprill, supra note 71, at 783.  
 172 ARTHUR PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 128-
32 (LexisNexis 2004).  
 173 Fishman, supra note 7, at 268.  
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Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with its pre-existing 
grantor-grantee relationships with numerous, smaller disaster relief 
organizations,174 should perhaps be required to make its own post-disaster 
grants contingent upon the formation of a financial oversight committee 
function in new disaster relief organizations. However, the reputation of 
FEMA is so mired in controversy surrounding its own lack of financial 
accountability that it would also be unrealistic to expect it to require 
good governance practices in grant recipient organizations after the next 
disaster.175 Lastly, if the IRS required a financial oversight committee, it 
is unclear what it would do to penalize organizations that do not comply. 
Tax revocation is not clearly within the remit of the federal government 
on the issue of  nonprofit governance.176 Ultimately, the limited resources 
of the federal government might make it impossible for the federal 
government to effectively regulate the governance of the nonprofit 
sector, in all of its breadth,177 and perhaps its role should be limited to 
reflect this.178 Critics that wish to maintain regulation in states, despite 
states’ very lax regulatory environment, disapprove of the general 
extension of this “federalization”179 of the nonprofit sector.  
The IRS may only be left with a limited but important role of 
education at the outset of the tax-exemption process and also in response 
to information gathered in Form 990s.180 First, governance 
recommendations for financial accountability after a disaster should be 
included in the application process for tax-exempt status.181 Second, the 
two pamphlets cited in this Note, one for disaster relief, and another one 
for good governance practices, should at the very least be integrated, 
published, and disseminated each time a new disaster relief organization 
receives tax-exempt status. Finally, the IRS should base renewal of tax-
  
 174 For a description of FEMA’s $150 million grant program after 9/11, see April 
Naturale, Someone to Lean On: Addressing Emotional Needs Through Project Liberty, 
http://www.fema.gov/remember911/911_lean.shtm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 175  Spencer S. Hsu, Leaders Lacking Disaster Experience, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2005, at 
A01 (“[I]nexperience in FEMA’s top ranks is emerging as a key concern of local, state and federal 
leaders as investigators begin to sift through what the government has admitted was a bungled 
response to Hurricane Katrina.”).  
 176 See supra Part II.B.2.  
 177 Fishman, supra note 7, at 272 (“It is doubtful that there will be a substantial increase 
in funding for enforcement activity at either the federal or state levels. The only realistic way to 
increase nonprofit accountability and to create new norms of fiduciary behavior is to leverage 
existing regulators’ efforts by making them more efficient.”). 
 178 Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 973 (“The IRS is not the appropriate agency to 
regulate charities; its role should continue to be limited to collecting revenue.”). 
 179 Aprill, supra note 71, at 769, 792 (proposing that the IRS should only establish 
minimum nonprofit governance standards and withdraw from regulating nonprofit governance if 
state law is adequate).  
 180 The broader idea of educating board members as a means of governance reform is not 
original. See, e.g., id. at 792; Brakman Reiser, supra note 94, at 276-78 (describing the importance of 
“[t]raining and [e]mpower[ment] [of] [n]onprofit [a]ctors” as a reform mechanism). 
 181  See supra text accompanying note 116.  
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exempt status upon  directors’ completion of educational programs that 
address the problem of financial accountability after a disaster.182  
Alternatively, the regulation of new disaster relief organizations’ 
financial oversight committees may better belong to the office of the 
each states’ Attorney General. In New York, the Attorney General 
recommends that all nonprofit organizations have internal controls, such 
as “policies and procedures that . . . promote compliance with laws and 
regulations and achieve effective and efficient operations . . . and include 
procedures for . . . handling funds received and expended by the 
organization . . . [and] evaluating staff and programs.”183 The Attorney 
General further recommends that the board be separate from 
management, that no one person receive or deposits checks, and that 
board members perform a periodic evaluation of the nonprofit’s 
programs for efficiency and effectiveness.184 However, the Attorney 
General must do more than make recommendations for general 
governance practices that can be easily ignored after a disaster.  
To the extent that a state Attorney General cannot enforce 
fiduciary duties because of its lack of resources and the rarity of 
prosecution power, one scholar has proposed the creation of a state 
Attorney General “charity commission” to fill the gap in regulation.185 A 
charity commission might have more flexibility than the Attorney 
General’s office to rapidly and continually monitor the work of new 
disaster relief organizations after they are incorporated by the state. The 
commission should review the composition and performance of an 
organization’s financial oversight committee. While regulation from a 
new state entity might lead to “regulating some charities out of 
existence,”186 the benefits of centralized, state leadership to all nonprofits 
in the aftermath of a disaster may outweigh the costs.  
2. Self-Regulatory Approaches  
A financial oversight committee norm187 can also be enforced by 
self-regulatory agencies after a disaster. Self-regulatory approaches to 
nonprofit accountability are based on establishing and applying best 
  
 182 Aprill, supra note 71, at 792. 
 183 ANDREW CUOMO, supra note 159, at 2. 
 184 Id. at 2-8, 12-13 (Many other policies and procedures are recommended, including 
conflict of interest statements, the establishment of a code of ethics, training, job descriptions, 
personnel policies, and a CPA).  
 185 Fishman, supra note 7, at 240-46 (arguing that citizen-staffed charity commissions 
under the auspices of the state Attorney General will improve adherence to fiduciary duties); see 
also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 249.  
 186 Id. at 267 (“Centralized standards are bound to have needlessly disastrous effects on 
the margin, even regulating some charities out of existence.”).  
 187 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 4, at 243 (“Norms are informal social regularities 
that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty or a fear of external 
nonlegal sanctions. Norms can transform the abstract mandates of the statutory fiduciary 
requirements into practice guides.”). 
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practices in governance.188 After a disaster, charity watchdog 
organizations should evaluate new disaster relief organizations and rate 
them according to whether or not they have a financial oversight 
committee.189 Watchdog groups should also educate donors about which 
organizations have strong enough financial oversight to justify 
donations.190 Self-regulatory nonprofit accountability is inexpensive, 
promotes voluntary adherence to best practices and preempts the need for 
government regulation.191 When a watchdog organization rates a new 
disaster relief organization, it can provide a “seal of approval”192 that 
helps donors, and potentially users, access comparative information on 
nonprofit governance to show that the board is committed to closely 
reviewing the receipt and allocation of funds.193 Both sophisticated and 
small-time donors should rely on self-regulatory disaster relief ratings to 
be better informed in the rush to donate after a disaster.194 Moreover, 
founders or board members of new organizations will comply with self-
regulatory standards in order to compete for donations.195  
The self-regulatory evaluation of new disaster relief 
organizations requires funding and staff that the sector’s private 
  
 188 PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 37, at 60; Brakman Reiser, supra note 
94, at 273 (specifically describing benefits of rating agencies). As an example of one rating agency’s 
standards, see BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, STANDARDS FOR CHARITY ACCOUNTABILITY, 
http://www.bbb.org/us/Charity-Standards (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
 189  PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 37, at 52-59 (cataloging numerous 
watchdog organizations that set standards and evaluate nonprofit organizations).  
 190  See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing Charity Navigator, a watchdog 
group that evaluates and rates 5000 nonprofit organizations and that has urged donors after 
Hurricane Katrina not to contribute to “newly formed charities” after a disaster); see also Charity 
Navigator, http://www.charitynavigator.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2009); Charity Navigator, 5 Lessons 
For Donors to Take to Heart, available at http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=katrina. 
article&cpid=454 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). 
 191 Brakman Reiser, supra note 94, at 273 (describing how such private sector 
“intermediaries” such as Better Business Bureau can rate charities and therefore lead to improved 
performance); Sidel, supra note 142, at 835 (arguing that self-regulation can prevent government 
involvement, which creates a situation where nonprofits are “diluted from their crucially important 
social roles or some charities are pushed out of the picture due to their size, a strong sense of 
autonomy, or their innovative spirit”). 
 192 See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 37, at 62. Self-regulatory 
approaches function in a variety of ways, including “accreditation, best practices, codes of ethics, 
seals of approval, and ratings.” Id. at 58. 
 193 Brakman Reiser, supra note 94, at 274 (“Donors do seem interested in information 
regarding the percentage of donated funds used for charitable purposes, as opposed to administrative 
costs. Similarly, they might like to know whether an organization to which they plan to contribute 
adheres to its mission and operates in line with its legal governance structure.”).  
 194 Id. As an example, Families of September 11 is an organization that has met the Better 
Business Bureau “Seal Program” for meeting a number of accountability standards. Families of 
September 11, FOS11 Governance, http://www.fos11.org/governance.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 
2009). 
 195 Manne, supra note 9, at 254 (supporting the general proposition that a nonprofit’s 
reputation impacts fundraising and concluding that “a donative charity perceived as uncontrolled in 
the midst of well-controlled alternative charities will be at a competitive disadvantage for the scarce 
dollars given to nonprofits”); Sidel, supra note 142, at 809 (arguing that self-regulatory standards 
have two purposes: to improve the function of nonprofits and to elevate the credibility of nonprofits 
by comparing them to one another).  
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watchdog groups may not currently have.196 Time constraints might be 
overcome if a fast-track accreditation system is designed to assess and 
rate new disaster relief organizations. On balance, a self-regulatory rating 
system that verifies at least the existence of, or continuing improvements 
to, a financial oversight committee in new disaster relief organizations 
provides a much more expedient solution to enforcement than existing 
government channels.   
3. Foundations  
Foundations have the opportunity and responsibility to 
encourage the formation of a new financial oversight committee at new 
nonprofit disaster relief organizations.197 First, foundations are 
dramatically different from individual donors based on their expertise in 
how to direct funds after a disaster. Also, foundations may have expertise 
in good governance and financial accountability because they can 
carefully plan and spend their own funds in a manner that pleases their 
own donors.198 Foundations can provide grants to improve nonprofit 
governance where donors may not.199 While disasters stir emotions and 
lead to enormous and even historic levels of impulsive giving from many 
small-time donors,200 such donors lack disaster relief expertise, let alone 
knowledge of what governance structure will ensure that their donation is 
well spent after a disaster.  
Finally, while foundations are limited in the extent to which they 
control what a nonprofit grant recipient does with its donation,201 they 
can condition grants after a disaster to new disaster relief organizations 
based on the formation of a financial oversight committee. Effectively, 
grants from foundations that implement such mandates lend legitimacy 
to a new organization. In contrast, self-regulatory watchdog groups lack 
the direct influence over a new disaster relief organization. Encouraging 
all foundations to condition grants on the formation of a financial 
oversight committee norm may be more effective than government 
  
 196 Aprill, supra note 71, at 789-90.  
 197 Sugin, supra note 77, at 893 (describing how increasingly “donors[] . . . impose their 
vision on the organizations they support”); Vanderwarren, supra note 79, at 979 (“Donors have the 
power to withhold their contributions if they believe an organization is not being managed properly. 
Such donors include rank-and-file public donors, foundations, and even . . . governments in their 
capacity as ‘donors.’”).  
 198 Brakman Reiser, supra note 94, at 270.  
 199 Strom, supra note 134.  
 200 NETWORK FOR GOOD, THE YOUNG AND THE GENEROUS: A STUDY OF $100 MILLION 
IN ONLINE GIVING TO 23,000 CHARITIES 9, available at 
http://www.networkforgood.org/downloads/pdf/Whitepaper/20061009_young_and_generous.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009) (“Disaster relief is the leading category of giving and ranks among top 
[online] searches . . . .”).  
 201 Manne, supra note 9, at 258 (“[I]t is in the nature of nonprofits that nearly all donors 
(and many beneficiaries) are unable to control or even observe the disposition of the corporation’s 
income.”). 
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mandates and self-regulatory evaluation, though ideally, the three 
approaches should compliment one another after a disaster. 
CONCLUSION 
The potential for theft, fraud, and waste creates financial 
accountability issues in new disaster relief nonprofit organizations that 
jeopardize the effectiveness of disaster relief in general which, in turn, 
tarnishes the reputation of the nonprofit sector. Accordingly, this Note 
strives to add to nonprofit legal scholarship on accountability by 
addressing a risky context in which nonprofits operate without necessary 
governance mandates. Despite the criticism offered in this Note, new 
disaster relief organizations do have extraordinary opportunities to 
perform a useful role.202 Particularly in the wake of a disaster when 
public trust and faith in public institutions can be diminished, small or 
new disaster relief organizations can provide the necessary one-on-one 
interaction, especially with disenfranchised groups, that helps 
communities recover from a disaster.203 By improving the efforts of so 
many courageous people who endeavor to help disaster victims, the 
healing process will be enhanced. Therefore, society should embrace 
these nonprofit disaster relief “rookies”204 and their board members with 
higher expectations, as opposed to lower ones. The failures of 
accountability in some new disaster relief organizations to date should 
not preclude new organizations with good governance practices from 
continuing to offer vital responses to disaster victims.205  
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organizations with “roots in the community” can be uniquely poised to “provide appropriate 
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 204 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
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